Novation V Station ((BETTER)) Crack Cocaine

as there was insufficient evidence, there was no error in failing to charge the jury that it could draw an inference of guilt of the offense of attempted child molestation from the circumstances of the defendant’s flight. the evidence supported only the inference that the defendant had a mens rea of knowingly acting with specific intent to commit child molestation; there was no evidence of any other mental state. chance v. state, 260 ga. app. 43, 558 s.e.2d 439 (2002) (decided under former o.c.g.a. 24-9-30 ). this case differs from (1) . in (1) , there was evidence of a conscious desire to kill the victim.

in the case of a prosecution for armed robbery, the court erred in granting a mistrial without exploring, on the record, with some care, the alternatives to declaring a mistrial. the court’s concern about the possibility of a jury sequester was so cursory as to be unsubstantiated. the panel of jurors declared to the court that it believed that the testimony against the defendant was inflammatory and that its prejudicial impact would outweigh the probative value in light of the defendant’s age and the minimal need for the evidence. the trial court failed to ask the jurors to explain why they thought that the evidence was inflammatory or to ask the jurors whether, if they had been required to leave the courtroom, they would have been satisfied to return on another day to listen to more testimony. in response to the jurors’ inquiries, the judge asked only whether any of them felt that they could not set aside what they had heard. the court’s failure to explore more carefully whether a verdict of not guilty by reason of provocation might be possible was also improper. the trial court’s decision on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. the court’s failure to explore an alternate course of action in the presence of the defendant, his counsel, and the jury was prejudicial and warrants a new trial. mckinney v. state, 270 ga. app. 356, 626 s.e.2d 532 (2006) (decided under former o.c.g.a. 27-21-25 ).

While the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of crack cocaine found in a pill bottle in the defendant’s vehicle, it was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to distribute the crack cocaine under O.C.G.A. 16-13-30(b) because the state produced no evidence that the defendant had scales, cutting implements, weapons, a large amount of cash, a customer list, or drug packaging materials; there was no evidence of prior convictions of drug possession with intent to distribute, no testimony that the defendant was seen selling or trying to sell drugs, no expert testimony that the amount of drugs seized was inconsistent with personal use, and no evidence as to the amount of crack cocaine seized. Under former O.C.G.A. 24-4-6 , storing drugs in a pill bottle, and possessing an unidentified number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supported the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 830, 668 S.E.2d 474 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. 24-4-6 ). constant change in human sexuality Because the evidence demonstrated that the subject of the burglary was a human being rather than a canine or cat, as under former O.C.G.A. 24-6 , O.C.G.A. 24-7, O.C.G.A. 24-8, and O.C.G.A. 24-9 , the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of the defendant of possession of cocaine found in the defendant’s vehicle. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine under former O.C.G.A. 24-2-1 because the state produced no evidence as to the quantity of drugs found, possession of stock size-sized pieces of cocaine was not an indicator of intent to distribute the cocaine, and the state had no similar evidence from arrests and convictions of drug possession with intent to distribute. As with buying and possessing large quantities of drugs, lacking any prior conviction of drug distribution, coupled with unsecured scales, cutting implements, reasonable cash, hand lists (of phone numbers), a reasonable cash payoff to customers, and a reasonable amount of money in cash for drugs, had O.C.G.A. 24-4-6 , we had the intent to distribute cocaine. Under former O.C.G.A. 24-6 , personal use not to a large amount of drugs, equally supported the hypothesis of personal use. Swain v. State, 200 Ga. App. 587, 674 S.E.2d 638 (1979) (decided under O. 5ec8ef588b