CLS Boeing 767 200 300ER FSX FS2004 By FSAQUI LINK

CLS Boeing 767 200 300ER FSX FS2004 By FSAQUI

maksym grabovsky, a boeing engineer who worked on the mcas system, told the new york times that he and his colleagues discussed the safety of the system for months, but the engineers did not think it was safe enough.

the engineers also thought that the systems manual would not be helpful, that pilots would need to be trained to adjust for the new mcas, that it would be nearly impossible for pilots to notice mcas problems at high altitude, and that it was possible to control an aircraft with a single stick. they recommended that the plane’s nose be lowered by 5.5 degrees instead of the 6 degrees that boeing used.

mcdonnell douglas soon began looking at the culture at boeing and saw that the company had some of the same problems that it was struggling with at the time. this included issues with ethics, dealing with unions, and the tension between top executives and engineers. these issues were, and still are, relevant to the 737 max.

mcdonnell douglas laid off 10,000 people, and, at the time of the crash, was in the middle of buying out the company. boeing, however, seemed to be going backwards, in the eyes of these executives. their leadership was now more closely aligned with the engineering culture that had been at the heart of the company for so many years. the chief executives of both companies had come from ge, which had a culture that was similar to boeing and that seemed to be under threat of disappearing.

this was the culture that boeing had been trying to get rid of for years. the boeing culture of the 1970s, for example, focused on the engineers and their concern for safety. this culture was increasingly at odds with the business practices of the time, which favored deregulation, reduced regulation, and the price-making function. boeing executives in the 1980s had attempted to make the company a smaller and more nimble firm. this culture at boeing now felt like a relic of a bygone era.

The 2019 crash investigation, which lasted seven months, found that Boeing had known for years that the plane’s flight-control software appeared to be a major source of potential problems. It was three months before the two MAX flights crashed, though, that Boeing disclosed to customers and regulators the precise model of the software it planned to use in the 737 Max. In fact, the flight-control software used on the first four MAX planes was almost the same as the software that had crashed on the Lion Air jet,the investigators found. But there were problems. The investigators said Boeing had not received proper certification for the software for the 737 Max from the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, Boeing had not equipped a plane with a second, backup flight-control computer to ensure that an emergency occurred when the software crashed. As a result, the FAA did not have the resources to investigate the initial Boeing reports of the plane’s control issues. I think one of the big messages that The Boeing Fatal Flaw will reach is the lintability of companies, of Boeing in particular, that will get away with the mistakes made in the industry long after an event like this. That has been the reality of Boeing for decades. But I think this book says we have to finally kind of get serious about doing something about it. A statement from Boeing says that as of Dec. 23, 2020, the company expects to fix some of the issues with the 737 Max 8 and 737 Max 9, and to conduct groundings of the 737 Max 8 throughout the new year. According to the statement, the company has been working “to get its products back into the air safely and has set in place a phased reopening of the 737 Max fleet.” 5ec8ef588b

CLS Boeing 767 200 300ER FSX FS2004 By FSAQUI LINK

CLS Boeing 767 200 300ER FSX FS2004 By FSAQUI LINK

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